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We	compare	 investigations	by	 the	SEC	with	 securities	 fraud	 class	 action	 filings	 involving	
public	companies.	 	Using	actions	with	both	an	SEC	investigation	and	a	class	action	as	our	





relative	 to	 SEC	 investigations.	 	 This	 evidence	 is	 consistent	 with	 private	 class	 actions	
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We	 begin	 by	 examining	 the	 abnormal	 stock	 price	 reaction	 in	 response	 to	 the	
disclosure	of	the	bad	news	for	the	firms	relating	to	the	underlying	securities	law	violation	
in	each	of	our	categories.		We	start	with	event	windows	for	our	studies	focusing	on	the	date	
of	 the	 first	public	disclosure	of	 the	securities	 law	problem	leading	 to	 the	 investigation	or	
the	class	action,	which	we	label	the	Violation	Date.		For	example,	a	company	may	announce	
an	internal	investigation	into	accounting	issues.		That	announcement	may	lead	the	market	









the	 Class	 Action	 category,	 which	 we	 label	 the	 Action	 Date.	 For	 our	 sample,	 the	 mean	
number	of	days	between	the	Violation	Date	and	the	Action	Date	was	as	follows:	73	days	for	










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































	 SEC		 Both	 Class	
Action	
2004	 122	 88	 142
2005	 113	 62	 106
2006	 149	 61	 58
2007	 80	 24	 132












Accounting	 0.174	 —	 0.154 — 0.221 —





























	 N	 −1	to	+1	 Positive:	
Negative	
Patell	Z N −1	to	+1 Positive:	
Negative	
Patell	Z
SEC	 332	 −2.09%	 129:203<<<	 −7.428***	 333	 −1.80%	 122:211<<<	 −7.285***	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Both	 229	 −12.73%	 35:194<<<	 −45.248***	 221	 −4.83%	 64:157<<<	 −18.558***	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Class	















	 Mean	 p‐value	 Mean	 p‐value
Both	 −0.017	 —	 −0.010 —	
SEC	 0.050	 0.001	 0.050	 0.003	
















































	 Mean	 p‐value	 Mean	 p‐value
Both	 0.546	 —	 0.554	 —	
SEC		 0.021	 0.079	 0.025	 0.082	













































	 Mean	 p‐value	 Mean	 p‐value
Both	 0.034	 —	 −0.015 —	
SEC	 0.006	 0.033	 0.006	 0.091	


























































Both	 −0.002	 —	 −0.004	 —	
SEC	 −0.001	 0.805	 −0.001	 0.248	























































 Incidence Monetary Penalty 
	 SEC		 Both p‐value SEC Both	 p‐value	
SEC	Settlement	 0.213	 0.404 0.000 12.6 13.1	 0.926	
	 Class	Action	 Both p‐value Class	Action Both	 p‐value	





	 Model	1:		 Model	2:	 Model	3:	




Class	Action	 	 −0.450* −1.072**
	 	 (−2.24) (−5.47)
	 	 	
Accounting	 −0.885**	 0.410 −0.0933
	 (−2.68)	 (1.62) (−0.46)
	 	 	
Restatement	 0.0528	 0.934** 0.329+
	 (0.23)	 (4.34) (1.89)
	 	 	
Market	Cap.	 0.123*	 −0.235** −0.0986**
	 (2.43)	 (−4.78) (−2.62)
	 	 	
Constant	 −1.317*	 1.976** 1.173*
	 (−2.06)	 (3.14) (2.45)
Industry	Controls	 Yes Yes Yes
N	 535	 556 884
























Class	Action	 	 −0.400** −0.180
	 	 (−3.14) (−1.18)
	 	
Accounting	 −1.425**	 0.359* −0.0286
	 (−3.99)	 (2.02) (−0.14)
	 	
Restatement	 −0.667*	 0.542** 0.279+
	 (−2.08)	 (4.11) (1.70)
	 	
Market	Cap.	 0.180**	 0.379** 0.265**
	 (2.68)	 (8.01) (6.03)
	 	
Constant	 0.535	 −0.342 0.590
	 (0.56)	 (−0.97) (1.31)
Industry	Controls	 Yes	 Yes Yes
N	 172	 258 375

















































































2004	 42	 34.4%	 16 18.2% 77 54.2%	
2005	 42	 37.2%	 26 41.9% 46 43.4%	
2006	 49	 32.9%	 28 45.9% 26 44.8%	
2007	 31	 38.8%	 13 54.2% 75 56.8%	




















Accounting	 0.099	 —	 0.120 — 0.248 —	
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